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Abstract  
 
The stylised facts of currency crises in emerging markets include output contraction 
coming hard on the heels of devaluation, with a prominent role for the adverse 
balance-sheet effects of liability dollarisation. In the light of the South East Asian 
experience, we propose an eclectic blend of the supply-side account of Aghion, 
Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000) with a demand recession triggered by balance sheet 
effects (Krugman, 1999). This sharpens the dilemma facing the monetary authorities - 
how to defend the currency without depressing the economy. But, with credible 
commitment or complementary policy actions, excessive output losses can, in 
principle, be avoided.  
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Introduction 
 
Key features of recent currency crises include a sharp output contraction coming hard 
on the heels of devaluation and the adverse effects of liability dollarisation threatening 
the solvency of commercial enterprises. The “third generation” approach developed 
by Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000), hereafter ABB, demonstrates how liability 
dollarisation can trigger a fall in output as devaluation disrupts the supply-side of the 
economy;1 and the possibility of multiple equilibria implies a risk of sudden collapse 
in the exchange rate. Their influential analysis applies beyond the region of East Asia 
for which the model was initially developed: ‘fear of floating’ in Latin America, for 
example, is widely attributed to such balance sheet effects, Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002), Calvo et al. (2003). 
 
By contrast, in ‘analytical afterthoughts’ on the Asian crises, Paul Krugman (1999) 
adopted a demand-side account of a small open economy to argue that “a loss of 
confidence by foreign investors can be self-justifying, because capital flight leads to a 
plunge in the currency, and the balance-sheet effects of this plunge lead to a collapse 
in domestic investment.” In a more detailed framework, Céspedes et al. (2003) have 
shown that devaluation can lead to demand contraction in a highly-dollarised open 
economy, where adverse balance-sheet effects overwhelm gains in trade-
competitiveness. 
 
What do the data suggest? Can these two approaches be reconciled? What are the 
implications for policy? These are questions tackled in this paper. The data for South 
East Asia (SE-Asia) reviewed in the first section suggest that financial crises affect 
both demand and supply. The former shows up as a prompt of contraction output: the 
latter as a down- shift in the trend path of potential GDP. Assessing the adequacy of 
policy can only be conducted when both supply and demand are taken into account. If 
demand is at risk, a key part of financial management will be to maintain demand. 
 
Exchange rate crises often face monetary policy-makers with a cruel dilemma: 
whether to raise interest rates to save the currency from collapse or to lower them to 
                                                 
1 While our analysis focuses on their initial basic model, notice is taken of subsequent developments 
published by the same authors wherever this is relevant. 
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maintain investment and future output. In section 2, the policy dilemma that follows 
from an adverse productivity shock is illustrated using ABB’s graphical approach. In 
section 3 we outline an eclectic alternative framework that incorporates the demand 
effects of an exchange rate crisis and of a credit crunch. When is it appropriate to raise 
interest rates in a crisis? In section 4, we present the condition given by ABB and 
indicate how it is affected by demand recession. After discussing first-best policy in 
section 5, we consider how high interest rates in the crises may be complemented by 
fiscal easing to maintain demand. We then discuss policy options to protect the 
supply-side from the adverse effect of high interest rates. After a brief consideration 
of alternative perspectives, suggested by data from India, the paper concludes. 
 
 
1. Stylised facts of crises in South East Asia  
 
The pattern of output contraction following sharp falls in the real exchange rate in 
four of the crisis countries in SE-Asia is shown in Figure 1, which plots GDP over 4 
years for Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand2. (The data are time-shifted to 
centre on the quarter before devaluation occurred, labelled as period 0; and output 
volumes in period 0 are normalised to 100.) Contraction typically begins in the two 
quarters following devaluation; and GDP reaches its lowest point within a year.  
 
                                                 
2 ABB cite Korea and Thailand as two possible case studies of their model. 
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Figure 1: GDP in SE Asia (quarterly)
Source: IMF:IFS. Note: the data are time-shifted to centre on the quarter before devaluation occurred, labelled as period 0; and output volumes in period 0 are normalised to 100.
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It is sometimes said that, for these countries, currency crisis abruptly changed the sign 
of the growth rate. The year-on-year fall in GDP in the four countries under 
discussion averages 10%, see Table 1, column 1.  
 
Table 1: Changes in GDP and exports: 1997-1998 
 Real GDP 
growth 
Growth in 
export volume  
Trend export 
growth 
Indonesia -13% -7% 5% 
Korea -7% 19% 14% 
Malaysia -7% 7% 11% 
Thailand -11% 8% 11% 
AVERAGE (unweighted) -10% 7% 10% 
Source: IMF:IFS. 
 
For small open economies it is commonly assumed that exports will act promptly to 
stabilise overall demand in the economy. In volume terms, on average exports from 
SE Asia continued to grow year-on-year -- but below trend. This was clearly not 
enough to offset the collapse of domestic demand, particularly in the case of 
Indonesia, see Table 1. 
 
A longer-run perspective of the impact of crises may be obtained by plotting realised 
output against an estimate of trend potential. This is what Aghion and Banjeree (2005) 
do for Indonesia in their Clarendon Lectures, using estimates of potential supply from 
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Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk (2004). Repeating the exercise for Korea produces 
similar results, as shown in Figure 2, with the initial trend path (estimated using pre-
crisis observations) labelled SS: output falls sharply, and then recovers to a lower 
trend path shown as S’S’. A matching analysis for Malaysia and Thailand, two other 
countries mentioned in ABB, is provided in Appendix A.  
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Figure 2: Shocks to demand and supply: the Korean case.
Source: IMF:IFS.   (Note: output volume is normalised to 100 in 2000; and the data seasonally adjusted by authors)
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How is this data to be interpreted in terms of demand and supply? On the Blanchard 
and Quah (1989) criterion, where shocks to output are classified as demand or supply 
depending on whether they are temporary or persistent, the Korean data in Figure 2 
would seem to indicate a severe supply-side shock. But would supply-side effects set 
in so rapidly? And with such magnitude? In the ABB model, moreover, it is future 
output that falls due to a productivity shock (amplified it may be by reduced 
investment due to the crisis): but output at the time of crisis remains unchanged as it is 
predetermined by past investment and productivity.  
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A more plausible interpretation of the data in Figure 2 might be that the prompt initial 
fall in output reflects a temporary demand effect3: while the subsequent downshift 
from pre- to post-crisis trend indicates a fall in potential supply. To accommodate this 
interpretation, represented in highly stylised fashion in the Figure, one needs to blend 
the determinants of demand and supply. This is the objective of this paper. 
 
2. Supply-side shocks and policy response  
 
Policy makers in East Asia faced a cruel dilemma: whether to raise interest rates to 
reassure foreign investors or to lower them in order to protect domestic industry.4 This 
policy dilemma is analysed by ABB who provide a formal condition which ensures 
that increasing domestic interest rates5 will avoid collapse. Is their analysis robust to 
fluctuations in demand? After allowing for demand contraction, we find a new, more 
restrictive, condition. Before discussing this and its policy implications, we briefly 
describe the ABB model and how it illuminates the policy dilemma. 
 
Theirs is a dynamic supply-side model which focuses on the balance sheet effects of 
devaluation on the private sector in a small open economy. With liability dollarisation 
and one-period of price stickiness for the traded good, a rise in the price of the dollar 
generates adverse balance sheet effects; so investment is cut back, reducing 
productive potential in the next period. This “third generation” account offers a 
persuasive channel for the transmission of the exchange rate effects to the supply side; 
and the multiplicity of equilibria opens up the prospects of sudden shifts in the 
exchange rate. Key features of this widely cited two-period model may be 
summarised as follows.6 
 
There is full capital mobility and uncovered interest parity holds. Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) for traded goods also holds, except in period 1 when an unanticipated 
                                                 
3For Thailand, for example, Fischer (2001, Chapter 1, p.14)  notes  that “it became clear during 
September and October 1997 that the crisis was taking a much greater toll on aggregate demand than 
had previously been expected.” (Italics added.) 
4 It has also surfaced elsewhere: in Brazil in 2002 when markets took fright at the prospect of a Left-
wing president to cite but one instance. 
5 In a later paper, the authors argue that "the correct policy response in this case is obviously to increase 
the interest rate i1 and/or decrease M2 so that the IPLM curve shifts downward." ABB (2001, p. 1141). 
We explore this possibility in Appendix C. 
6 The relevant equations are given in Appendix B. 
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shock leads to a deviation as prices are preset, but other variables — the nominal 
exchange rate in particular — are free to adjust. The actual timing of events in period 
1 is: the price of traded output is pre-set according to the ex-ante PPP condition and 
firms invest; then there is an unanticipated shock7, followed by the adjustment of 
interest rate and the exchange rate; finally, output and profits are generated, with a 
fraction of retained earnings saved for investment in period 2. Together with 
investment funded by lending, this determines the level of production in the second 
period, when prices are flexible so PPP is restored.  
 
An attractive feature of this model is that the equilibrium can be found as the 
intersection of two schedules relating output and the exchange rate as in Figure 3. 
(Note that output is lagged one period behind the exchange rate, measured by the 
domestic currency price of a dollar; and that we have taken the liberty of using the 
more suggestive labels SS and MM in place of the labels W and IPLM in ABB.) First 
is aggregate supply, the S-curve, sloping downwards from a floor level at YR: this 
incorporates the adverse balance-sheet effects of liability dollarisation on investment 
and reflects the impact of productivity shocks. Second is asset market equilibrium, the 
M-curve, which captures the impact of foreign interest rates and post-crisis monetary 
policy. (Some factors impact on both schedules: the increase in interest rates when the 
shock occurs, for example.) The intersection of these two curves defines equilibrium, 
as shown at point A in the Figure.  
 
These schedules highlight the dilemma faced by policy-makers after a significant, 
unanticipated decline in productivity. The negative shock moves SS down to S’S’ 
threatening to lead to recession at D in Figure 3, where the M-curve intersects the 
floor on output denoted YR. “What is the best monetary policy response to such a 
shock, if the objective is to limit the output decline and more importantly, to avoid a 
currency crisis?” ask ABB (2000, p. 736). Their answer is that “A standard 
recommendation (the IMF position) is to increase the interest rate … this shifts down 
the Asset Market curve”. As this induces a further contraction of supply, however, 
S’S’ shifts further to the left. ABB go on to provide a condition that ensures that the 
M-curve moves to the left more than the S-curve as interest rates increase: if satisfied, 
                                                 
7 If the shock is anticipated, the expected price adjustment eliminates the balance sheet effect, Becker 
(2006). 
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higher interest rates will avoid recession and deliver equilibrium at a point such as B 
on S’’S’’. 
Y 2
E1
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M
YR
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D
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M
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C
S''
Figure 3: A supply shock with monetary tightening
S'
S''
Productivity schock
 
3. Allowing for demand failure -- and “twin crisis” 
  
The ABB analysis assumes that there is no aggregate demand failure resulting from 
the productivity shock. Investment may fall due to balance sheet effects, but this does 
not affect output at the time of the currency crisis. The demand for exports of a small 
open economy is typically assumed to be unlimited: so export demand would, in 
theory, provides an automatic stabiliser. The data, however, do not support this. Calvo 
and Reinhart (2000), for example, find that in case of an emerging market currency 
crisis, exports typically fall before recovering to their pre-crisis levels: the lag before 
recovery is 8 months or, with a banking crisis, 20 months. In an investigation of 
devaluations in emerging economies, Frankel (2005, p.157) concludes “that 
devaluation is contractionary, at least in the first year, and perhaps in the second as 
well.” These observations, together with the data in Figure 1 above, suggest that 
excess supply may indeed be a problem at least in the short run. 
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To modify the supply-side approach and allow for demand contraction, the obvious 
step is to incorporate a multiplier effect of depressed investment on GDP, taking 
exports as pre-determined in the short run. To further justify the assumption that 
exports are slow to respond, note that the crisis in East Asia was spread across the 
region: so nearby markets were in no position to absorb extra exports. Other factors 
include contract lags and physical capacity constraints: the export response to the 
spectacular fall of the Indonesian currency in 1997/98 was considerably hampered by 
lack of container shipping capacity, for example. In support of the Keynesian 
specification of demand determination, note that firms are in any case credit-
constrained in the ABB model; and that if devaluation is accompanied by a banking 
crisis (“twin crises”), both consumers and producers will typically be denied access to 
new credit.  
 
With demand-determined output, the fall of investment will cut current output and 
consumption. Specifically, let output in period 1 be determined as follows: 
 
( ) ( )( )( )* *1 0 1 1 2 1 1 11 1DY A Y D Y D X mYγβ μ β= + − + + − − + −      (1) 
 
where ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )* *1 1 0 1 1 11 1 /c cD E r D i E P D D= + + + −  is the total cost of debt services 
and Y1 is aggregate demand measured in constant prices. The first term, 0A , 
represents  autonomous expenditure (which is not related to debt or current income). 
The second term indicates how consumption demand depends on income and debt, 
where β  < 1 is the labour share of income and γ < 1 is the fraction spent on 
consumption. The third term is demand for investment with ( )*1 1Y D− representing 
corporate profits net of borrowing costs, and µ the credit multiplier. The last two 
terms represent net exports, where export volumes are assumed fixed in the current 
period while imports vary proportionally with current income.  
 
The failure of export volumes to stabilise demand means that a collapse of investment 
(due to balance sheet effects, for example) can reduce realized output in the current 
period (as well as supply potential in the next period), as can be seen from the solution 
for current output: 
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( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( )
*
0 1 1 2 1
1
2 1
1 1
1 1 1
D
A X D E i
Y
m i
γβ μ β
γβ μ β
⎡ ⎤+ − + + −⎣ ⎦= =⎡ ⎤+ − + + −⎣ ⎦
*
0 1
11
SA X D Y
m
ξ
ξ
+ − <− +    (2) 
 
where ξ = ( )( )11 1tγβ μ β++ + −  and 1 > 1 − ξ + m > 0, and 1SY is the aggregate supply 
in the same period. The predetermined factors in the numerator include debt service 
and exports volumes; and the term ( )1/ 1 mξ− +  is a Keynesian-style multiplier, 
where 1-ξ is the marginal propensity to save and m is the marginal propensity to 
import. 
 
How demand failure can lead to prompt contractionary devaluation is indicated in 
Figure 4, with output in period 1 on the horizontal axis and the exchange rate in 
period 1 on the vertical. As it depends on output and interest rate in the previous 
period, aggregate supply appears as a vertical line 1
SY . Aggregate demand, however, 
moves inversely with the current exchange rate due to the adverse balance-sheet 
effects of a devaluation which raises the price of a dollar from E0 to E1 and increases 
( )*1 1D E in equation (2). At E1, for example, demand has fallen by AB.  
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Figure 4: Aggregate demand and supply in period 1.
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In a “twin crisis”, devaluation will be accompanied by demand failure as the credit 
crunch will reduce the multiplier ( )2 1iμ in equation (2) and shift the aggregate 
demand schedule further to the left, as shown by the dotted line in the Figure.8 So 
output could fall to C at E1. As for the effects of raising interest rates to defend the 
exchange rate, they are demand-contractionary:  an increase in the period 1 interest 
rate will reduce 1
DY   as high interest rates impact adversely on the credit multiplier 
and so on investment.  
 
In Table 2 we compare and contrast the standard ABB model, where output is supply-
determined, with what occurs when exports are predetermined. For ABB, an adverse 
devaluation-induced shock to the balance sheet in period 1 has no effect on period 1 
output (which is determined by previous period investment), but cuts it in period 2 via 
reduced capital accumulation, see column 1. 
 
                                                 
8 Becker (2006) discusses the conditions under which a credit crunch will reduce output in this context. 
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Table 2: How demand recession modifies output levels. 9 
 ABB’s Model Our modification 
Y1 ( ) ( ) *1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1
( ) 1 1
( )
S
S D
Y A B B i Y D
Y Y A B B Y
σ μ α ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
= =
 
( )( ) ( )*1 1
0
1 1 1 1
1 1
        
( )
D
t t t
t
D S S
Y Y D
A X mY
Y Y Y Y ABB
γβ μ β+⎡ ⎤= + + − − +⎣ ⎦
+ + −
= < =
 
Y2 ( ) ( ) *2 2 1 1 1( ) 1 1SY A B B i Y Dσ μ α ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 2 2 2
( )D S SY Y Y ABB= <  
 
 
When there is excess supply in period 1, however, the impact of an anticipated 
currency collapse is more immediate and more damaging. Balance-sheet effects 
reduce investment in period 1 directly: but this triggers a contraction of income within 
the period, which in turn leads to even less investment as profits fall. The knock-on 
effect on period 2 means that future supply is less than predicted by the ABB model.10 
 
An important issue addressed in the Clarendon lectures is whether the effect of high 
rates on bank lending will be offset by the anticipated adjustment of prices – whether 
( )2 1iμ  should depend on the nominal or the real rate of interest. In theory, adjusting 
the nominal rate for expected inflation when price stickiness ends, will drastically 
diminish the prospect of crisis. In practice, however, nominal rates in crisis countries 
were pushed to extraordinarily high levels, much higher than subsequent inflation. 
When markets panic, it seems, real rates rise too and credit is cut back. For these 
reasons, we stay with the original ABB formulation where the S-curve slopes 
downwards.11 
 
 
                                                 
9 Note that in table 2, we have followed ABB in assuming that output in period 2 is supply-determined. 
This does not mean that output in period 2 matches that of the ABB model, however: the contraction is 
greater because of the reduced investment associated with the fall in aggregate demand in period 1. 
10 Cutting µ1, credit multiplier corresponding to period 0, would have same effects on period 1 supply 
in both models. 
11 This is the crisis-prone intermediate case referred on pp. 1142-3 of ABB (2001): see Clarendon 
Lectures pp.117-21 for further discussion. 
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4. When is it safe to raise interest rates in a crisis? 
 
ABB provide a condition for when it is appropriate to raise interest rates in a crisis. 
We have seen graphically that it is appropriate to raise the domestic interest rate only 
if the negative impact of so doing on the S-curve is smaller than on the M-curve. 
Consequently, tighter money can lead to a non-collapse equilibrium. The formal 
condition, such that increasing interest rate 1i  will avoid collapse of the economy is: 
 
C1:         
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )( )
' * 1
1 1 1 0 1
1 1
*
11 1
1 1
11 1
c c
c
Ei P Y r D i D D
P E
ii i D D
μ
μ
⎡ ⎤− + − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦− < ++ + −  
 
 
see ABB (2000) page 736. So tight money is appropriate when there is substantial 
external debt and the credit multiplier is relatively insensitive to higher interest rates. 
 
But what if there is a demand recession? In fact, we find that demand-determination 
of output in period 1 alters the conditions under which high interest rates can 
strengthen the currency. A general proposition summarising this is as follows: 
 
Proposition 1 When period 1 output is demand-determined, as in (2) above, an 
increase in the period 1 interest rate will strengthen  the domestic currency less than 
when output is supply- determined. (Proof in Appendix C.) 
 
Referring back to Figure 3, note that equilibrium at point B assumes that 1 1
D SY Y= . 
With exports slow to react, however, devaluation will be contractionary for output: 
and the knock-on effect of demand failure on future potential output would shift the 
supply curve for period 2 to the left of S’’. With demand failure in period 1, there may 
thus be no intersection with the M’-curve until output in period 2 falls to depression 
level YR  and the price of the dollar rises sharply, as at point C in Figure 3. In short, 
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showing that current monetary tightening would stabilise the exchange rate in the 
absence of demand effects is no guarantee that it will do so when demand collapses.12 
 
When output in period 1 is demand-determined, the condition that ensures that the M-
curve moves leftwards more that the S-curve when 1i  increases becomes: 
 
C2: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
' * 1
1 1 0 0 1
1 1
*
111 1
1 1
1
111 1
c c
c
Ei P A X r D i D D
mP E
im ii i D D
μ βγ
β βγ β μμ
⎡ ⎤+ − + − + −⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦− <⎢ ⎥ +− + − + −+ + − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
a condition clearly more restrictive than C1. 
 
 
 
5. The challenge for policy 
 
The problems posed by capital account crises are quite subtle: how to maintain 
confidence in a currency when private creditors are fleeing; and how to do this 
without damaging the economy. This will surely require appropriate action both by 
local policymakers and the IFIs. Here we focus on policy in the country affected.13 
 
This section proceeds as follows. Initially, we show that the first-best policy in 
response to a supply-side shock that reduces future output is to tighten money in the 
future and not when the shock occurs. Second we consider how high interest rates in 
the crises may be complemented by fiscal easing to maintain demand. We then 
discuss policy options to protect the supply-side from the adverse effect of high 
interest rates. 
 
                                                 
12 Of course, if exports fail to respond sufficiently promptly, output may also fall below supply in 
period 2 as well. 
13 Woods (2006) focuses on the role of the IMF and World Bank. 
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To show that tightening future money is an appropriate policy in the ABB model is 
straightforward14. Absent demand failure, the shock has no effect on current output, 
but lowers future output. To avoid a rise in future prices - and the consequential rise in 
the dollar implied by PPP - future money must be lowered in line with reduced 
supply. That this will stabilise the exchange rate and so avoid the adverse balance 
sheet effects in the private sector can be seen from Figure 5: the new equilibrium is A’ 
where output contracts in line with the productivity shock -- but no further. Appendix 
D shows that the exchange rate remains unchanged when the leftward shift in S-curve 
due to adverse productivity shock is matched by an appropriate reduction of the future 
money supply (M2).  
 
E1=E0
Figure 5: "First-best" monetary policy
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This policy avoids at a stroke the need to raise interest rates at the time of the  shock: 
but it means doing nothing in the crisis while promising to take action in the future, 
and this may not be credible. Assume that, for whatever reason, this first-best policy is 
                                                 
14 Notwithstanding the discussion at the end of ABB (2000, p.737), the authors observe in a later paper 
that “the correct policy response in this case is obviously to increase the interest rate i1 and/or decrease 
M2 so that the IPLM curve shifts downward.” ABB (2001, p. 1141).  
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not implemented, and interest rates are raised at the time of the shock. Will raising 
interest rates avoid recession?  
 
To answer this question, we use the conditions C1 and C2 derived earlier. It may be 
that the degree of dollarisation and the interest elasticity of credit are sufficiently 
small so that both conditions are satisfied, as in column 1 of Table 3, so raising 
interest rates will help reassure investors in the foreign exchange market without 
throwing the economy into depression. (This is far from first best, however, as will 
become apparent presently.)  
 
Table 3: Is it safe to raise interest rates (i1) in a crisis? 
 Safe Risky 
1 D SY Y
C =  Satisfied Satisfied 
2 D SY Y
C <  Satisfied Not satisfied 
 
What if the condition C1 elaborated by ABB (on the assumption that demand matches 
supply) is satisfied, but C2 is not satisfied, as in column 2? In this case, interest rate 
effects on demand exacerbate the contraction of Y2 sufficiently so as to rule out 
equilibrium above YR. Is this recession inevitable?  
 
 
(i) Maintaining demand 
 
The dilemma for the monetary policy arises from having two objectives – to 
strengthen the currency and protect the economy – with only one instrument, i1. 
Tinbergen’s principle would suggest looking for another policy instrument. What if 
tight money is complemented by an easing of fiscal policy? The logic in support of 
this is straightforward. If fiscal policy is used to stabilise aggregate demand in the way 
that exports would have (if they had time to adjust), then condition C2 no longer 
applies, only C1: and this is satisfied by assumption.15 
 
                                                 
15 In terms of equation (2), it would be autonomous demand A0 that adjusts to prevent excess supply 
instead of exports, X. 
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We conclude that condition C1 derived by ABB is appropriate either if demand for the 
output of a small open economy in crisis is inherently stable, or if fiscal policy is 
eased sufficiently to achieve the same result. Otherwise, there is a clear risk that 
unmitigated tight money will cause recession. It is no surprise that IMF policy targets 
for fiscal tightening in the midst of the East Asia crisis attracted serious criticism.16 In 
fact, as  Fischer (2001Chapter 1, p. 15) notes in his Robbins Lecture on ‘The First 
Financial Crises of the Twenty First Century’, “The internal debate over appropriate 
fiscal policy, both within the staff and with the Board [of the IMF], intensified as the 
crisis worsened, and as outside criticisms increased. By early 1998, budget targets 
began to be eased”. 
  
 
(ii) Protecting supply  
 
Demand stabilisation in a crisis may help avoid recession but the outcome is still 
second best: high interest rates have undesirable supply-side effects that were in 
principle be avoided by the first-best monetary policy discussed above. Can one get to 
first-best despite raising interest rates? Let us consider policy actions to be taken at 
the time of crisis to maintain the supply of credit (and the level of investment). 
  
(a) Emergency credit and/or fiscal transfers (to stabilise the S-curve) 
  
To avoid the contraction of credit, the government could try to ensure that banks keep 
current credit lines open; or it could provide temporary finance itself, e.g. extra 
lending via an emergency government loan programme might be considered.17 Absent 
further shocks, such loans should be repaid.  
 
Given that the firms are credit-constrained, increasing cash flow could also help. If 
firms still want to invest despite the high interest rates, fiscal devices in the form of 
temporary investment allowances and/or accelerated depreciation might be used. To 
protect commercial firms from the higher cost of borrowing, interest rate subsidies 
                                                 
16 See for example Stiglitz (1999). 
17 Government actions taken in Thailand to help distressed firm stay in business are discussed in 
Luangaram (2003). 
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could be employed. Let 11 i+ be the net-of-subsidy cost to firms that borrow in 
domestic currency and let 11
1-
i
s
+⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  be the gross return to lenders, and let  the subsidy s 
be chosen to stabilise the exchange rate i.e. to set E1=E0.18 Note that the supply of 
credit should not change if banks are aware of the subsidy, i.e. the credit multiplier 
will depend on the post subsidy of borrowing. Graphically, while high interest rates 
have moved the M-curve to the left, the impact on the S-curve has been avoided by 
the subsidy.  
  
If the adverse impact of high interest rates on current investment could be completely 
offset by financial or fiscal assistance in this way, this would ipso facto solve the 
problem of maintaining demand. To achieve first best, future money supply would 
also need to be adjusted in line with reduced supply to avoid inflation and 
depreciation. 
 
(b) Capital controls (to shift the M-curve) 
 
An alternative policy is to drive a wedge between the rate needed to reassure external 
investors and the domestic rate relevant to corporate investment by imposing 
temporary controls on capital , as  recommended on a temporary basis by Paul 
Krugman in an ‘Open letter to President Mahatir’ in September 1998. Krugman’s 
article in Fortune was entitled ‘It’s Time to Get Radical’ because the IMF at that time 
was very much committed to capital account liberalisation. (A year earlier, for 
example, in September 1997 after the Thai baht had been devalued  Stanley Fischer  
had strongly supported  changing the IMF Articles so as to mandate capital account 
liberalisation, Fischer, 2004, Chap 5). 
 
A creditor standstill was implemented in Korea in December 1997, for example, when 
IMF and G7 funding was insufficient to meet anticipated withdrawals until key banks 
were persuaded to rollover their credit lines. But it was Malaysia that put Krugman’s 
                                                 
18 This requires that ( )   21
0
1 1 *
1-
i Ei
s E
+⎛ ⎞ = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , where 
 
2E  is the (higher) price of the dollar expected to 
prevail in period 2.  
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counsel to the test. The IMF Occasional Paper “Malaysia: From Crisis to Recovery” 
describes the initiatives taken as follows: 
 
In September 1998, the Malaysian authorities launched a policy package designed to 
insulate monetary policy from external volatility. Measures included an exchange rate 
pegged to the U.S. dollar and selected exchange and capital controls, complemented by a 
fiscal stimulus package that stepped up capital spending. These measures permitted the 
subsequent lowering of interest rates. The authorities also pursued fundamental reforms 
in the financial and corporate sectors, including a bank consolidation program and an 
upgrading of prudential regulation and supervision in line with international best 
practices. (Meesook et al., 2001) 
 
A time-shifted, differences-in-differences comparison of the course of events in Korea 
and Malaysia was conducted by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001). They note that Malaysia 
recovered swiftly from crisis after the imposition of capital controls and conclude that 
it grew faster than it would if it had adopted an IMF programme as in South Korea 
and Thailand.19  
 
In principle, temporary capital controls could be used to implement the first-best 
monetary policy discussed above. Here is the logic. Assuming that, in the period of 
the crisis, the announcement of future tight money is not credible, higher interest rates 
for overseas investors in domestic currency would normally be needed to keep the 
current value of the dollar below its (higher) future expected level. But the domestic 
economy can be protected from rising interest rates by capital controls which tax the 
proceed of investing in dollars,  see  Aghion et al. 2001 pp. 1131-2 for discussion. The 
arbitrage condition becomes: 
 
 *
21 11 (1 )(1 ) /i i c E E+ = + −            (3) 
 
where   2E to refer to the expected exchange rate in period 2 and 0<c<1 indicates the 
tax paid by domestic residents on their holdings of dollar assets.20 
 
After substitution, the asset market equilibrium is defined by: 
 
                                                 
19 See also Schiffrin reference. 
20 Alternatively, dividing through (3) by 1-c, one could interpret 1/(1-c) as reflecting a subsidy, where 
1+i1 is, as before, the net-of-subsidy cost of borrowing in domestic currency, while ( ) ( )11 / 1-i c+  is the 
higher gross rate received by lenders. In this case, capital controls permit the temporary rise in 
domestic rates needed to reassure foreign investors without affecting the domestic economy. 
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 *
2
1
1 2 2
1(1 )
1 ( , )
s
i ME c
i L Y i
+= − +        (4) 
 
where   2
s
M  refers to the expected money supply in period 2. Appropriate choice of c 
will shift the M-curve to the left as shown in Figure 5, keeping E1 at its pre-crisis level 
without any increase in i1. Subsequently, in period 2, capital controls can be removed 
and money credibly tightened. As c goes to 1, this will represent the extreme case of 
no capital mobility where the M-curve disappears (see Aghion et al. 2001, p. 1132) 
and the domestic authorities are free to set interest rates at any level and peg the 
exchange rate (as in Malaysia). 
 
Capital account liberalisation allows for high speed movements; such controls act like 
emergency brakes. Whether governments can switch capital controls on and off in this 
fashion without losing credibility is an interesting question: on which East Asian 
experience may throw some light.21 
 
(c) Debt restructuring (to make the S-curve vertical) 
 
As the dollar-denomination of debt lies at the heart of the balance sheet problem for 
private firms, relieving them of this debt burden should help. This was the motivation 
for cancelling the gold clause in US commercial debt in the time of President 
Roosevelt. He persuaded Congress to cancel the Gold Clause in debt contracts when 
the US left to Gold Standard in 1933 and devaluation raised the dollar value of gold-
denominated debt by about 70%; cancelling the Gold Clause kept dollar values 
unchanged.22  
 
The operation of a “Super-Chapter 11” to provide across-the-board relief to 
corporations with dollar debts as advocated by Joseph Stiglitz would have much the 
same effect, as discussed in Miller and Stiglitz (1999). A contemporary illustration is 
                                                 
21 The case for ex-ante inflow controls, like those used in Chile, has been articulated  by Levy-Yeyati 
(2005)  both as a pre-emptive measure to avoid the rapid build-up of speculative dollar liabilities and so  
that, in an panic, less-than-one-year investors cannot exit with all their assets. 
22 This abrogation was  “a key part of Roosevelt's first hundred days', providing the foundation for 
much of the New Deal policies directed at deflating the economy including departure of the US from 
the gold standard", Kroszner (2003, p.1). 
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the pesification of all dollar debts (up to a threshold of 100,000 dollars) promulgated 
by President Duhalde in Argentina in 2002 -- an action taken in conscious imitation of 
President Roosevelt, Sturzenegger (2003, p.48-49). Baldi-Delatte (2005) argues that 
pesification played a key role in the post-crisis recovery of the Argentine economy.23 
 
In terms of the model being discussed, it is dollarisation of corporate debt that gives a 
negative slope to the S-curve: consequently de-dollarisation makes the S-curve 
vertical, i.e. independent of the price of the dollar. This, of course, is why it mitigates 
the risk of financial collapse.  
 
 
6. Alternative perspectives  
 
On ABB’s assumption that countries of South East Asia suffered idiosyncratic 
supply-side shocks which would reduce output some time after the exchange rate 
crisis, we have discussed the need for fiscal easing to check the immediate deficient-
demand-led fall of output. This is, of course, a counter-factual exercise: output did fall 
sharply as “the sign of the growth rates changed” in the countries concerned. Imagine, 
nonetheless, that the necessary demand management policies had  promptly been put 
in place. The result could have been the delayed step-down shown by the trend lines 
in Figure 1, without the immediate drop in output. 
 
There are, however, other possibilities that could be considered in future research. 
First that insulating domestic capital markets may help ensure macroeconomic 
stability; second that this may be at the cost of lower long-run growth. Both 
possibilities may be illustrated using GDP data from India, see Figure 6.  
 
Supply-side shock or capital-market crisis?  
 
Indian capital markets were kept relatively closed during in the 1990s and the country 
escaped the currency and output shocks suffered by many of its neighbours, 
                                                 
23 The Argentine case, however, provides a warning: relieving non-financial corporations of dollar 
debts at the cost of bank net worth may prove counterproductive by causing a credit crunch, Miller et 
al. (2005). 
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Williamson (1999). Figure 6 shows little sign of any shift of potential in India at the 
time of the SE Asian crisis, as a single exponential trend seems to fit the data. The 
Indian experience suggests that successful stabilisation of output could have 
prevented any step-down in trend GDP. Could the supply contraction identified on the 
Blanchard/Quah criterion be endogenous -- due to the lagged effects of low 
investment and bankruptcy in a severe demand recession?24 On this interpretation, the 
contagion that spread from Thailand to Korea was not some irresistible strain of 
supply-side decline, but spreading exchange rate panic25 which, properly handled, 
could have avoided the hysteresis effects of a recession. The calculations of the costs 
of the crisis by Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk (2004) are, we believe, based on such an 
assumption. Treating the initiating shock not as a fall in productivity but as credit 
contraction induced by financial contagion might be more appropriate in such 
circumstances, Aghion and Banerjee (2005, p.108 ).   
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Figure 6: Indian GDP
Source: IMF:IFS.   (Note: output volume is normalised to 100 in 2000; and the data seasonally adjusted by authors)
 
 
                                                 
24 There was, for example, a pronounced step-down in trend output in the US as result of the Great 
Depression. 
25 With respect to the crises in Indonesia and Korea, ‘contagion seemed to play a dominant role. But the 
contagion hit economies with serious financial and corporate sector weaknesses.’ Fischer (2001, 
chapter 1, p. 11).  See also Fratzscher (2003).  
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Crisis as the cost of progress? 
 
For some observers, however, capital market crises may be part of the cost of 
achieving faster growth. Ranciere et al. (2002, Abstract) note that ‘countries that have 
experienced occasional financial crises have, on average, grown faster than countries 
with stable financial conditions’; and they illustrate by comparing Indian trend growth 
with that of Thailand.26 In their view, “financial liberalization policies that facilitate 
risk-taking increase leverage and investment: this leads to higher growth, but also to a 
greater incidence of crises.” Ennis and Keister (2003) provide an alternative analysis 
of financial development, financial crisis and long-run growth. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee trace the impact of devaluation on domestic 
investment and the supply-side of the economy via the balance sheets of credit-
constrained firms: and the possibility of self-fulfilling crisis they uncover could help 
explain why many emerging markets live in “fear of floating”. Exclusive focus on 
supply-side economic contraction is an unnecessary limitation of their analysis. 
Demand failure may also be part of the story, due to a lag in export demand 
substituting for a falling investment orders in the midst of  regional turmoil, for 
example; or to a credit crunch for a country suffering a ‘twin crisis’.  
 
If this is the case, Tinbergen’s principle suggests complementing tight money with 
fiscal easing to maintain demand – a conclusion that the IMF itself appears to have 
drawn from the East Asian crisis27. In fact, first best policy in the ABB model requires 
credible promises of future tight money without high interest rates during the crisis. If 
this is not credible, fiscal and financial transfers and capital controls may be 
appropriate to shield the domestic economy from the impact of high rates.28 
                                                 
26 “GDP per capita grew by only 99% between 1980 and 2001 in India, whereas Thailand’s GDP per 
capita grew by 148%, despite having experienced a major crisis.” (Ranciere et al., 2002, p.1). 
27 “What lessons have been drawn from these episodes? Certainly, that fiscal contraction may not be 
necessary in all balance of payments crises. If debt sustainability is not an issue, and if the contraction 
of domestic demand… combined with devaluation will produce a sustainable current account, then 
fiscal policy can be used counter-cyclically.” (Fischer, 2001, Chapter 1, p15.). 
28 Note that we are again appealing to Tinbergen’s principle and not simply arguing for lax monetary 
policy, Aghion and Banerjee (2005, p. 118). 
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The purpose of this paper is not to evaluate crisis management policies on the part of 
national governments or international agencies in the course of the SE-Asia crises of 
in 1997/8.29 The aim is to develop an eclectic framework in which balance sheet 
effects can impact both supply and demand. The dilemma facing the monetary 
authorities is given sharper focus; as is the case for complementary policy actions. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Malaysia and Thailand 
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Figure A.1:  Malaysian GDP.
Source: IMF:IFS.   (Note: output volume is normalised to 100 in 2000; and the data seasonally adjusted by authors)
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Figure A.2. Thai GDP
Source: IMF:IFS.   (Note: output volume is normalised to 100 in 2000; and the data seasonally adjusted by authors)
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B  Asset Market and Aggregate Supply schedules  
 
In more detail, the schedules are as follows. The M-curve – short for what ABB call 
the IPLM curve -  is a combination of the Uncovered Interest Parity, money market 
equilibrium and the PPP condition for the second period. Formally, it is written as: 
  
*
2
1
1 2 2
1
1 ( , )
sMiE
i L Y i
+= +                           (B.1) 
 
where 1E is the exchange rate for the first period, 
*i is the foreign interest rate, 1i i1 and 
2i  are domestic interest rates for periods 1 and 2, 2
sM  and 2Y  are money supply and 
output in period 2, and 2 2( , )L Y i  is the money demand function. This M-curve is 
downward sloping in the 1E  and 2Y  space because higher output in the second period 
increases money demand (i.e., higher L given interest rate in period 2) and so 
strengthens the exchange rate (note 2
sM is given). 
 
The S-curve characterizes the supply of output on the assumption that entrepreneurs 
are credit-constrained and corresponds to what ABB call the W-curve. (The 
production function is assumed to be linear in capital stock, which depreciates 
completely at the end of the period.) Total investment consists of last-period retained 
earnings together with borrowing (in both domestic and foreign currencies, with 
proportions given exogenously) which is limited to a given fraction )( 1−tt iμ  of the 
retained earnings. The introduction of )( 1−tt iμ  (with 0'<tμ ) captures credit market 
imperfection. The S-curve is specifically given by 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−+−−+= cc DD
P
EiDrYiY 1
1
1*
0112 1111 αμσ                      (B.2) 
where σ  is the productivity parameter, α  is the fraction of output consumed in each 
period, 1D  is the total level of borrowing and cD  is its domestic currency 
component. The S-curve so constructed is a downward sloping straight line in 1E  and 
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2Y  space, for levels of output above recession
30. Clearly, this formulation captures the 
contractionary effect of devaluation on the supply-side.  
 
Finally, equilibrium (Y2, E1) is given by any intersection of (B.1) and (B.2). Note that, 
because of the non-linearity of both schedules, multiple equilibria may well exist. 
 
C. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Let equilibrium (Y2, E1) under our specification be given by the intersection of (B.1) 
and (B.2), with Y1 in (B.2) being replaced by the Keynesian demand given in equation 
(2) in the text. Then the proposition is true if an increase in i1 induces more leftward 
shift to Y2 in our specification than for ABB. Since the interest rate effects on Y2 are 
negative in both cases, this requires: 
            
 
Differentiating Y2 in (B.2) with respect to i1 (with Y1 replaced by 1
DY from (2)) yields 
 
( )
( ) ( )( )( )
'
2 12 1
2 2 1
1 2 1 1
1 1
1
D
MFZ
iY YY i
i i i
μ σ μ αμ
∂ ∂= + + −∂ + ∂  
where the first term on the left hand side is what obtains for ABB’s specification, and 
the second term gives the additional effect arising because the output in period 1 is 
demand determined. As it is clear from equation (2) in the text that ∂ 1
DY  /∂i1 < 0, so 
the inequality above must hold.  
 
D. Implementing “first best” monetary policy in ABB 
 
Given that the money demand function satisfies: 
 ( , ) ( , )0;   0;    ( 0, ) 0t t t t t
t t
dL Y i dL Y i L Y i
dY di
> < = > , 
and that the productivity shock reduces output: 
                                                 
30 For convenience, ABB use Y2=0 to denote the recession level of output (which we label as YR in the 
text) and set Y2 =0 if the right hand side of (B.2) turns out to be negative. 
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(where 'σ  is the productivity parameter after the shock); 
then one can obtain '2M  implicitly from equation (B.1) as follows: 
'*
2
1 0'
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1
1 ( , )
MiE E
i L Y i
+= =+                             
So '2M  is the expected money supply for period 2 which, if credibly  announced in 
period 1, will keep the exchange rate stable at its pre-crisis level.  
